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INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom has always been 
a crucial issue in Indonesia. On behalf of 
religion, and God for certain, some minority 
groups, which addressed with several name-
calling: deviant (sesat) or heathen (kafir) 
are aggressively attacked and assaulted. 
The number of this religious violent is 
continuously mounted, particularly after the 
New Order period. Setara Institute reported 
that during 2011 there were various religious 
intolerance and violence that involve state 
as an actor both by commission or tindakan 
aktif and ommission or tindakan pembiaran
 
(Hasani and Tigor, 2012: 22-23) One might 
recalled to the New Order, such conflicts was 
rarely been found, or safely to say this matter 
would not emerge in public nor became a 
public attention or object of knowledge. The 
State had controlled everything. 
Through its repressive and authoritative 
power, any ‘subversive’ action was silenced 
before it even had a chance to speak. And 
under the jargon of ‘safety and orderliness’, 
religion was considered as a public threat; 
it was believed of having potential to rise 
conflict and ruin the stability of the State. 
Apparently, that was the main reason why the 
State preferred militaristic approach rather 
than diplomatic ones; the State might, for 
instance develop policy to liberate religion. It 
is also applied in political aspect. 
During the New Order, political parties 
were dissolved into three  political parties 
only.So, it was understandable why the 
relation among religion framed by using the 
terminology of “inter-religious harmony” (
kerukunan beragama) rather than “religious 
freedom” (kebebasan beragama). 
Compare to the New Order, the relation 
between the State and religion during the post-
New Order is far more complex. The power 
of the State is constrained. It has become less 
and less authoritative. Its repressive power 
is soften. On the other hand, the concepts 
of nation-state and citizenship politics as 
hegemonic instrument are slowly faded 
along with bankruptcy of the New Order. 
Yet, after the New Order period ended, the 
State is suffered from serious legitimation 
crisis. 
Consequently, it encourages the 
emergence of identity-based politics; 
to name one example among many- as 
articulated in religion-based politics. Within 
such socio-politics constellation, the State, 
which experiences legitimation crisis, does 
not have another option but to compromise 
with the interest of religious-based politic 
group, especially majority ones. However, 
the “soft state” stamp which has been 
printed to the State in the post-New Order 
should be situated within the conjuncture 
of aforementioned socio-politics condition 
(Nordholt, 2008: 18-19).
Considering the conjuncture of socio-
politics condition as suggested earlier, 
following questions may come to mind: how 
should religious truth understood within the 
context of religious freedom in Indonesia? 
What mode of religious understanding and 
social episteme dominate the discourse of 
religious freedom in Indonesia? What kind 
of “politics of truth” frames the discourse 
of religious freedom in Indonesia? And, 
what mode of religious understanding can 
be generated as a common language to 
encourage the birth of genuine religious 
freedom?
Surely, the answers to those questions 
deserve more than just a sentence or two. 
The discourse of religious freedom is very 
complex, indeed. Herein the contestation 
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of power takes place as the State and other 
interests groups struggle to retain their 
hegemonic influence toward the society. 
Furthermore, this contestation shapes the 
look of actual religious freedom in Indonesia. 
It also brings to light other fundamental 
concepts, namely politics of truth, as well as 
religious understanding and religious truth. 
To some extent, this contestation is 
merely a mode of expression for conflictive 
religious truth and understanding. How 
people respond, consider, and act on the 
name of their religion, of course - do not based 
on a blind faith. But rather, it is driven by 
certain epistemic framework. This modality 
gives legitimation and motivation to people’s 
behavior. Certain labeling, such as: ‘heresy’ 
(ajaran sesat), ‘apostate’ (murtad), ‘deviant’ 
(menyimpang), or even ‘desecration’ (penodaan 
agama) is consciously addressed to ‘the 
others’ and considered as sort of self-virtue. 
Or to be more concise, judgments function as 
manifestation of religious understanding.           
DISCUSSION
Epistemological Religious Truth
Normatively speaking, Indonesia 
is fully submitted to religious freedom 
principle Religious life is guaranteed legally 
by constitution of the State (Wikisource, 
2012: 1). Yet, the interpretation tends to be 
problematic. It is important to note that, the 
discourse of religious freedom is not solely 
defined by ‘who can speak’,  but also its 
epistemic pattern. Officially, the government 
acknowledges five religions while others 
categorized as a belief. 
For instance, please consider the 
case of Ahmadiyah below. It will help us 
identify the dynamics of religious freedom 
in Indonesia, particularly when it comes to 
dominant religious truth and understanding. 
To comprehend this case better, it will be 
analyzed by employing hermeneutical 
discourse analysis. In this manner, our concern 
will focus on the foundation and criteria used 
by the State and majority groups to claim 
Ahmadiyah as a minority group while put 
into the larger context of religious freedom. 
As a hermeneutical discourse, the issue 
of religious freedom is much more concern in 
anthropological implication of religious truth 
rather than religious truth per se (Garret, 1978: 
3). What is interesting here are, legal basis 
and argumentation for banning Ahmadiyah 
is heavily relied on theological language and 
assumption. What makes it more interesting 
is that this theological language also based 
on certain religious understanding, which 
gives legitimation to ban Ahmadiyah. 
Some theological categories, to name a few: 
‘heresy’, ‘deviant’, and even ‘religious insult’ 
are recklessly employed. 
In addition, one point stated on 
Indonesian Joint Ministerial Decree (Surat 
Keputusan Bersama Tiga Menteri): “To warn 
and command whole citizen not to recite 
and interpret certain religion in Indonesia 
by referring to UU No 1 PNPS 2005 about 
religious insult prevention” (Andi R, 2011: 
1). It is assumed that violating the rights 
of Ahmadiyah follower (commonly refer 
to as Ahmadis) is permissible as a logical 
consequence to their ‘false belief’: “their 
belief is heretical, it is logical if their rights 
violated by law!”
Terminologies as mentioned earlier, 
whether ‘deviant’ or ‘heresy’- prevail in 
certain discourse of religious truth. Simply 
put the interpretation of religious truth 
operates through a certain pattern, which 
henceforth would be called epistemological 
religious truth. It is identifiable by its ‘true-
false’ criteria to claim religious truth, includes 
Ahmadiyah. In this sense, religious teachings 
is treated like scientific proposition with set 
of fixed procedure and criteria to verify its 
truthfulness. 
Ahmadiyah is claimed to be false as 
if it has been proven through scientific 
assessment. Here, the rule is rather simple: 
there is only one single truth, and the rest 
are totally false. When it comes to truth, it is 
always in a singular form rather than plural. 
Unsurprisingly, religion is simply reduced as 
‘a system of thought’, which can be verified 
whether it is true or not (Brockelman, 1992: 
141-142). Religious truth is assumed to work 
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as reflexivity model, which applied in science 
(Ricoeur, 1965: 170). 
‘True-false’ criteria in interpreting 
religious truth is used in a similar manner 
to measure scientific proposition. Besides, 
religious truth is also simplified as set of 
objective belief statements. More precisely, it 
is considered as an adequacy, kind of a ready-
to-use tool kit that is applicable to assess and 
evaluate ‘the truth’ while ignoring specific 
context and situation.
Moreover, it is important to note that 
religious truth always involves interpretation. 
Interpretation is not entirely independent, 
but rather dependent on specific mode, which 
functions as a ‘metaphor’. By metaphor, I 
mean as a specific mode or way to understand 
and experience one concept in terms of 
another concept (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 
3-6). However, metaphor does not only help 
us to understand religious truth through 
comparison or analogy, but also, more 
importantly, to structure our perception and 
understanding toward religious truth (Lakoff 
and Johnson, 2003: 3-6).
It appears that the main problem lies in 
interpretation of ‘true-false’ terminology. If the 
metaphor borrowed is from scientific mode, 
scientific criteria will structure our perception 
and comprehension toward religious truth. 
Yet, these criteria are problematic, especially 
when applied to assess religious truth. 
Simply put, if ‘true-false’ criterion is operated 
as scientific discourse, in a sense that it 
would evaluate the degree of compatibility 
between perception and reality, between 
concept and objective reality- herein emerges 
two categories of religion: true religion 
(orthodoxy) and false religion (heterodoxy). 
Besides, there will be claim toward religious 
truth, which objectively in accordance with 
God’s Will, and so forth. Thus, religious truth 
from ‘epistemological’ mode standpoint can 
be briefly described as followed:
“ … an interpretative idea is supposed to 
carry over what is important in the object 
into the interpreter in the respect in which 
the idea represents the object. If it does 
carry over the value, it is true and if it does 
not, it is false. Truth is thus a dyadic value: 
either true or false. To use the Aristotelian 
language, a claim is true if it says of what is 
that it is and what is not that is not” (Neville, 
2001: 163).
Thus, this so-called religious truth is 
easily fall into absolute-monolithic religious 
understanding. Absolutely, this kind of 
interpretation tends to violate religious 
freedom. Indeed, the basic assumption of 
absolutism and monadism is in stark contrast 
to the logic of religious freedom. As a result, 
the society becomes more monolithic and 
socially exclusive, which makes it nearly 
impossible for ‘the other’ to survive. The 
case of Ahmadiyah, as suggested in earlier 
discussion, clearly illustrates how the 
absolute-monolithic religious understanding 
may legitimize and motivate marginalization 
and social exclusion by labelling ‘deviant and 
misleading’ (sesat dan menyesatkan). Please 
consider following statement:
“(T)he decisions and the recommendations 
of the World Mosque Council …entirely 
confirm what had been established by [the] 
research bureau…of the Saudi Arabian 
kingdom: this group (Ahmadiyah) is deviant 
and misleading (sesat dan menyesatkan). And 
[the World Mosque Council] recommends 
issuing a fatwa which declares Qadiyaniah 
(Ahmadiyah) to be outside Islam… It is, 
therefore, hoped that the (Indonesian) 
Ministry (of Religion)…undertakes 
appropriate actions to ban the activities of 
the (Ahmadiyah) and explains its deviant 
and heathen nature to the religious people 
of Indonesia” (Platzdasch, 2011: 6).
True-fasle orientation to religious truth 
has been implemented in that statement and 
brought certain epistemological implication 
in judging ‘the other’. While religious 
freedom pays higher respect to the values 
of otherness, absolutism and monadism are 
completely opposed to this idea. Rather than 
acknowledge the existence of ‘the others’, 
absolutism marginalize and exclude them. 
Thus, the issue is not primarily about legal 
status of Ahmadiyah but the horizon of 
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religious truth and tolerance in the context of 
religious freedom.
Existential Religious Truth
The discourse of religious freedom will 
be continuously in danger if true-false criteria 
or epistemological religious truth becomes 
a dominant religious understanding. As 
mentioned earlier, the logic of absolute/
monolithic is contradictory to the idea of 
pluralism – which is a basic principle for 
religious freedom. As a critique toward 
epistemological religious truth, I would like 
to offer alternate religious understanding by 
applying Ricouerian hermeneutical analysis, 
namely ‘existential religious truth’. 
Before commencing this discussion, 
kindly note that the term existential used 
here to emphasize that religious truth 
is neither a ready-to-use tool kit nor an 
adequacy; but rather best understood as a 
process of expressing and transforming the 
self. Religious truth is not only pursue “the 
question of ‘what it is’ (epistemological 
problem) but also to ask ‘what does it mean 
to me?’ (existential problem)”. In correlation 
with this issue, in post-modern worldview, 
truth is supposed to be existential: “My 
experience is the basis for my beliefs, 
and those beliefs exist to empower me” 
(McCallum, 1996: 202-203). 
Former question tends to create a 
fixation of truth, meanwhile the latter 
focuses on realization or manifestation of 
truth that relies on existential experience. 
More precisely, religious truth is not a matter 
of having, but rather a matter of being. As a 
matter of being, for Ricoeur, “the search for 
truth is itself torn between the finitude’ of 
my questioning and the ‘openness’ of being” 
(Ricoeur, 1965: 51). Following Ricouer’s 
assumption, truth always belongs to certain 
life-world (lebenswelt), which is the life drama 
itself: “drama wherein freedom and the body, 
death and fault, passion and habit, history 
and private life are the principal challenges 
for reflection” (Ricoeur, 1965: 156).  
Further, truth is not something to 
be think of, neither to be standardized as 
mathematical formula or scientific algebra. 
Instead, truth is something to live with, which 
in turn will produce certain world-horizon 
applicable to evaluate the truth itself and 
establish ‘self-understanding’. One might ask 
bewilderingly: how do we suppose to live 
by the truth? Is it far more important than 
“having” the truth itself? (Sugiharto, 1994: 
86). While put into the context of religious 
truth, truth claim is not simply about testing 
which one is true and which two is not, 
but more importantly is how this truth can 
transform someone else’s life. 
Therefore, it is obvious that Ricouer 
refutes the principle of objective truth as 
mediation between reality and perception, 
between Being and Thing, which in this sense 
refer to “the principle of identity” (Ricoeur, 
1976: 8-9). It argues that truth is neither 
direct nor immediate. No mediation needed. 
But, in fact the relation between reality and 
perception is not direct. It is always mediated 
through language. To explicate further, let us 
begin by discussing the dimension of truth. 
Actually, language does not only function 
as an instrument, but also as a constitutive 
element in the process of understanding, just 
say, as a discourse. 
Meanwhile, discourse is the dialectic 
between “event” and “meaning” which 
expressed in some propositions. One of the 
important themes in the literature on truth is 
its connection to meaning, or more generally, 
to language. This has proved an important 
application of ideas about truth, and an 
important issue in the study of truth itself. 
(Glanzberg, 2006: 20) Without language, 
understanding is impossible, indeed. Truth 
is entirely linguistical, to put in another 
word: truth does not exist outside language; 
but instead, fully mediated by language. 
The production and articulation of truth is 
constituted in/through language. 
By referring to poetic discourse, it is the 
creativity in composing words that makes 
truth becomes re-descriptive, speculative, 
and the possible. For Ricoeur, “the ‘being 
as being-as’ of poetic discourse (which is 
where metaphors abound) is a disclosure of 
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how things truly are, but this disclosure is 
speculative and focused on the ontology of 
the  X” (Simms, 2010: 3). It means is signifies 
a creative element in language.  Since we are 
extremely dependent on language in order to 
obtain the truth and self-knowledge, herein 
emerge hermeneutical problem of truth. 
As suggested before, truth is a linguistic 
event, which involves process of interpreting 
in/through language. What distinctive here 
is that language has a capacity to create 
‘event’ by correlating “verbal potentiality 
and non-verbal actuality” (Ricoeur, 1978: 
215). It is parallel with linguistic ability to 
break the rigid relations between words and 
the world. In other words, it presents an 
imperative description of making event that 
is “even beyond the description of ‘seeing as’. 
Thus, truth is an is, a potential idea and event, 
not absolute ones. Yet, it has to be discovered 
within the frame of linguistic event which 
constitutes a process of intersubjective 
communication where creativity in linguistic 
skill is basically required.             
Those assumptions originate from 
Ricouer, in which he argues about 
hermeneutical activity, which emphasizes the 
primacy of language. Searching for religious 
truth is kind of hermeneutical activity that 
it involves discovering and constructing 
meaning. Simply, meaning is not waiting 
somewhere out there to be found. But instead, 
it is articulated. It is spoken. Interpreting is 
articulating meaning. There are millions of 
possible meaning can be articulated. In this 
sense, language also has million possibilities 
to create meaning. Therefore, understanding 
and cognition mean an articulated meaning, 
which involve process of interpretation by 
language. 
By interpreting, we articulate meaning 
and by articulating this meaning, we ‘create’ 
our self, just say we turn out to be the subject 
of language. Thus, searching for meaning is 
synonymic to creating meaning. However, it is 
not to suggest that we can arbitrarily produce 
meaning. The point to highlight is that 
hermeneutical activity is best understood as 
productive and creative activity rather than 
a reproductive activity. As a hermeneutical 
activity, reading text is productive and 
creative in a sense that our self is transformed 
through the interpretation process, which 
applicable in validating the truth of certain 
religious text and religious truth in general. 
Using this alternate perspective, 
hermeneutical activity will not be dominated 
with epistemological issue; instead, it has 
moved further to the ontological-existential 
(Thiselton, 1992: 345), so-called potentialities 
of existing (Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979: 
129). The salient point to be made is that, 
interpretation is a moment and event of 
creative and creation; in another sense, 
we ‘create’ ourselves through language. 
Concerning this topic, Ricouer has composed 
a very expressive argument as follow:
“To understand is not to project oneself into 
the text but to expose oneself to it; it is to 
receive a self enlarged by the appropriation 
of the proposed worlds which interpretation 
unfolds. In sum it is the matter of the text 
which gives the reader his dimension of 
subjectivity…Reading introduces me to 
imaginative variations of the ego. The 
metamorphosis of the world in play (in the 
text) is also the playful metamorphosis, of 
the ego” (Sugiharto, 1994: 84).
 
Relying on that assumption, Ricouer’s 
hermeneutic further suggests that how to 
‘question’ is far more important than how to 
‘answer’ it. As a logical explanation to this 
will be briefly described as follow. 
First, this questioning method will give 
us wider opportunities to observe ‘influential 
situation’, which leads to an answer (Ricoeur, 
1965: 48). As discussed earlier, both of 
opportunities and situation are far more 
crucial than the answer itself. 
Second, questioning will stimulate us to 
be ceaselessly self-reflexive and extroversive 
while restrain us from being trapped to ‘an 
absolute answer’ as well as inertia in thinking. 
Third, mentality of questioning signifies 
mentality of openness. Questioning indicates 
an open mind, even imaginative thinking 
since it also involves ‘moments of disclosure’. 
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The search for truth is more empowered 
to truth-discovery or the discovery of the 
meaning of its situation rather than grasping 
classic definition of truth that concerns to 
equation of thought to reality (Ricoeur, 1965: 
48). 
Moreover, it makes us realize the 
ontological effect of the limit and relativity 
of our perspective (Moyert, 2010: 730). Put 
in another manner, questioning method 
is creative by character, so it enables us to 
perform transcendent process, in the sense 
that creates new horizon, which may broaden 
and enrich ourselves:
“The question is required in order to 
determine just what issue we are engaging 
whether it is this issue or that in order to give 
direction to our attention. Without this no 
meaningful answer can be given or received. 
As a question, however, it requires that the 
answer not be settled or determined. In sum, 
progress or discovery requires an openness 
which is not simply indeterminacy, but a 
question which gives specific direction to 
our attention and enables us to consider 
significant evidence” (Mc.Clean, 2003: 61-62).
In the case of Ahmadiyah as previously 
discussed, the fixation and monopoly of truth 
makes us reluctant to think creatively and 
as a consequence, we easily fall to an early 
judgment (Ricoeur), for example by create 
discriminative labeling.
The Role of Language and Question 
in Ahmadiyah Case
It is interesting to explore further the 
relation between Ahmadiyah and religious 
majority from linguistic perspective to see 
what lies ‘beyond epistemological religious 
truth’. The meaning of Ahmadiyah is 
articulated in a public discourse as ‘deviant’ 
and ‘heretical’. In this sense, Ahmadiyah is 
considered as different, strange: just like an 
alien stranded in human world. Indeed, true-
false category is applied to test the veracity of 
Ahmadiyah. Somehow, it shows a linguistic 
deadlock to understand and sympathize to 
‘the others’. 
Put into another word, there have to be 
‘new language and vocabulary’ to articulate 
and justify the rights of Ahmadis as certain 
life-world. Oft-repeated labeling such as 
‘heretical’ and ‘deviant’ is like a ‘dead end’ 
where communication meets failure. It is not 
surprising though, to ask bluntly- how should 
communication take place if both sides speak 
in completely different language? However, 
there has to be a common language through 
which communication may possibly occur. 
This dead end in communication, eventually, 
constitutes a dead end in language.
Actually, category of ‘deviant-believer’ 
is only one set of possibilities available in 
the field of language. Borrowing the idea of 
‘linguistic generosity’ principle, language has 
a great potency to yield an alternate meaning. 
However, it is not impossible to generate ‘new 
meaning’ in order to understand ‘the others’, 
or Ahmadiyah in this context. ‘Linguistic 
generosity’ principles assumes that language 
poses transformative function, in this sense 
it has capacity to re-define reality. Simply 
say, through this transformative function 
the meaning of Ahmadiyah is constructed 
within/through language. So, it is through 
language we can transform the meaning as 
well as transcend ourselves to the reality that 
‘Ahmadiyah’ perceived as ‘the other.’ 
In this extent, language is no longer 
dominated with dogmatic-apologetic 
understanding, but rather move further to 
post-dogmatic-transformative direction. 
Basically, this post-dogmatic understanding 
is required to prolong communication with 
Ahmadiyah as ‘the other’. As suggested 
earlier, applying dogmatic understanding 
will be useless, communication will certainly 
meet a dead end. Instead of considering 
Ahmadiyah as a distinct life-world with 
its uniqueness and particularity, it has 
been judged solely based on its conformity 
with majority. In dogmatic language and 
understanding, religiosity is somehow 
reduced and simplified as ‘identity’ matter, 
not as a lively expression.
The tension to potentiate the language 
capacity to understand otherness, which put 
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into the context of religious freedom in today’s 
Indonesia, assumes that religion, somewhat, 
can be understood as language, so we can 
make analogy between ‘language translation’ 
and ‘hermeneutics.’ (Takács, 2011: 3). At this 
point, religious interpretation and language 
interpretation are analogous. Similarly, dead 
end in communication as illustrated earlier 
can be identified as a failure in translation. 
Further, translation can act as a model 
which suit perfectly on discussing religious 
freedom in Indonesia, particularly when 
it comes to the topics of ‘the other’ and 
‘otherness’. Indeed, communication is possible 
when two parties involves understands each 
other. While, in order to understand each other, 
certainly, needs the power of ‘translation.’
Up to this point, translation relates with 
ethical-philosophical dimension. Angelo 
Botteno re-formulates Ricouer ideas on 
‘translation’ in a comprehensive manner:
“Translations for him not only a linguistic 
but also a philosophical issue as far as it 
regards problems of identity and otherness. 
A translator is someone who says the same 
thing in another way. In the act of translation 
two partners are in relation: the foreigner 
(foreign work, foreign author, foreign 
language) and the target reader (who can be 
the translator himself or somebody else, the 
public). The translator is in between, that is 
exactly where his task lies: to be in between 
two othernesses. Translation is about making 
connections, linking one culture to another” 
(Angelo Bottone, 2004).
To explicate further, translation pays greater 
attention to find out how to prevent a dead 
end in communication (expand to more 
extreme point, such as: domination and 
marginalization). Crucial point to be made 
is that, how to reach mutual understanding 
between two parties involved? However, it is 
not to suggest that there will be no differences 
exist between them, neither to assume that 
they should speak in the very same language. 
Precisely, this is where translation plays its 
part, to bridge differences between them by 
firstly relativising universal assumptions. 
Put in a more succinct way:
“The languages present themselves as 
singular insofar as the they can never be 
cashed out into a perfect translation without 
semantic remainder, and translatable insofar 
as these two irreducible languages can 
communicate to and understand each-other 
nevertheless. Here, through the patient, 
hospitable work of the translator, the two 
previously heterogeneous languages are 
brought into a dialogue with one-another 
and allowed to learn from the rich cultural 
and semantic resources unique to each. 
In other words, the “desire for a perfect 
translation” has been reworked into the 
more appropriate “desire to translate” or 
understand, a desire won through the long 
practice of “linguistic hospitality” as an 
attempt to engage with and understand the 
other without assimilating her into a pre-
determined universality” (Vessey, 2000: 4-5).
Considering the power of ‘desire to 
translate’ in the exchange of meanings, then 
translation is a movement of  transcending 
differences and exposing oneself to the 
‘test of the Other’ (Garcia,  2008: 336-337). 
In a translational mode of understanding, 
therefore, we could hope of having a 
paradigm of forgiveness because of being 
different from us and the frame of tolerance as 
central than true-false category. Moreover, 
through translation we are compelled to leave 
aside conventional-dogmatic vocabulary 
to articulate, for instance, the meaning of 
Ahmadiyah as the other. In this respect, 
true-false category is no longer applicable. 
Translation is not about searching for ‘the 
truth’, but rather to experience together, or for 
the sake of what stated in oft-cited Islamic 
verses, blessing to the worlds (rahmatan lil 
‘alamin). Simply say, translation is about 
‘openness to the others.’ 
For instance, we can treat ‘the others’ as 
a friend whom we just met who shares his/
her story ranges from his/her childhood to 
his/her neighborhood. We may feel amazed, 
and much more surprised, when find out 
that there are many interesting aspects in 
someone else’s life which we do not know 
yet. However, ‘listening’ is the main (or the 
greatest) issue here. Surely, listening is not 
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a passive activity. It constitutes the ability 
to absorb information needed to produce 
a positive feedback. During this learning 
process, “translation is also extending our 
ability to listen to others and to assimilate the 
implications of their feedback for entering 
more deeply into our own religion” (Mc.
Clean, 2003: 63). 
An additional point worth making 
is that, listening enables us to learn from 
others, to better understand ourselves better, 
and, eventually, it may lead to new form of 
sympathy for the other.  Henceforth, I would 
like to elaborate three basic assumptions 
regarding the ethics of translation and 
‘listening method’ as ethical consequence to/
for draw meaning of the others.
First, ‘listening method’ assumes that 
“openness towards the other does not consist 
so much in surveying others objectively or 
obeying them in slavish and unquestioning 
manner, but is directed primarily to ourselves, 
our self-understanding” (Mc.Clean, 2003: 
63). In fact, listening will be more difficult 
than judging others. At this point, listening 
method strongly opposes the concept of 
early judgment as well as epistemological 
standard, which regard religious truth as a 
fixed system. Consequently, in dealing with 
‘resistance’ religious majority/state, listening 
method provokes a space for ‘receptivity’, 
i.e, considering Ahmadiyah as an equal 
interlocutor in a living discourse. 
Second, translation model has 
transgressed ‘true-false’ category in referring 
to ‘the other’. Instead of considering the 
others as an obstacle to religious purification, 
it is best considering them as new source 
of fruitful information to enrich our self-
understanding. In addition, it helps us to 
enhance our skill in listening  to others as 
well as “to assimilate the implications of their 
answers for entering more deeply into our 
own religious truth and heritage” (Mc.Clean, 
2003: 63). 
In the case of religious freedom, 
resistance is usually coming from certain 
religious groups of religious majority in 
terms of keeping the principle of self-identity 
or regarding themselves as the owner of 
official religious truth. Through translation 
model, the existence of Ahmadiyah could be 
a mediation of knowledge and even an open 
invitation to improve our wisdom, i.e, to treat 
Ahmadiyah as a mediation of auto-critique as 
such that it may contain the possible answers 
of our own religious question as well. This 
perspective eventually leads to enrichment 
of our religious understanding with new 
vocabularies  beyond ‘true-false’ category.
To sum up, one key concept originated 
from Ricouer might be useful to interpret 
the truth, particularly in religious freedom 
context, namely: openness. Openness is a 
potential method to discover the truth, which 
relies on three crucial aspects: the intersections 
among the world horizon, the primacy of 
asking, and awareness to limitation of our 
perspective. These components could be an 
inclusive frame of thinking outside ‘true-
false’ category in viewing an reflecting the 
existence of Ahmadiyah as the other. 
In this sense, as a hermeneutic discourse, 
life-world (Lebenswelt) can be a good source 
and reference to unfold the religious truth. 
Lebenswelt constitutes the world we live in, 
a place where our existential aspirations as 
a human being grows vigorously, and a site 
where we exchange meaning perpetually. 
Religious truth is deeply rooted inside 
the Lebenswelt; and, herein religious truth 
is framed not as a system, but rather as a 
lively living thing. This means, the way we 
experiencing life inside this Lebenswelt will 
produce a horizon of living-truth. 
Consequently, the reference framework 
of Lebenswelt will work better as a ‘horizon’ 
by stimulating the emergence of new 
possibilities, a new being-ness, a new self, 
rather than looking for fixed, certain and 
static answer for the truth. To be briefer, 
religious truth signifies an infinite horizon, 
which always asks for new definition, as 
truth is rooted firmly in a dynamic basis of 
Lebenswelt. 
In such frame of Lebenwelt, the experience 
of exchange of meanings, aspirations and 
truth  are actually taking place, especially 
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between religious majority and Ahmadiyah, 
where religious truth is imagined as a living 
truth raher than fixation of truth. Within the 
framework of Lebenswelt religious truth is 
a process and project of exchange to shape 
self-understanding; far from the search for a 
single truth or the unity of truth, it constitutes 
‘suspension of truth.’ 
Consequently, rather than viewing 
religious truth as a certainty, religious 
truth as a ‘suspense’ becomes an unlimited 
opprotunity for religious majority and 
Ahmadiyah to discover together ‘something 
more’. In other wrods religious truth is 
a mater of becoming true. Furthermore, 
Lebenswelt provides a living foundation to 
discover the truth in ‘historicity’. This is the 
reason why when conceived as a history, 
Lebenswelt reflects a vague shadow of truth, 
which challenge us to find the dimension of 
the inexhaustibility of truth which will always 
be waiting for us up front that challenges both 
religious majority and minority. Therefore we 
need to place truth within its eschatological 
character of unity which will be parallel with 
placing truth as a historization (Ricoeur, 1965: 
185-186).
Consequently, Ahmadiyah must be 
placed in the frame of historization of 
indonesianess where we grow together or 
being as.  Thus, at least it would prevent the 
forms of alineation in the level of mutual 
understanding, the dictatorship of single 
truth and provide ‘infinite formulations of 
truth’ which are also beyond language that 
formulate it. Instead of single truth, historical 
frame of interpretation opens the possibility 
of various and multiple truths:
“No one individual, no one historical period, 
can claim to have exhausted the exploration 
of truth, or rather to have opened itself 
totally to the manifestation of truth. Each 
individual and each period, instead, is called 
to make his original contribution to this opening 
up of truth (22). As Pope John Paul II said in 
his peace message for the year 1985: “Man’s 
journey through history is like a pilgrimage 
of discovery” (Fedrigotti, 1985: 8).
 Herein I offer some insights originate 
from Ricouer’s theory of interpretation: (1) 
Religious freedom is closely related with the 
matter of truth, which based on existential 
principle as follow: desire to be, desire to live, 
desire to exist, rather than desire to know. Hence, 
religious truth is a ‘living truth,’ the truth 
about our existence, our beingness, or our 
deepest aspiration as human being; not as 
justification to our belief; (2) interpretation is 
a mode of being, which involves the activity 
of interpreting, as well as creating ourselves. 
Thus, religious truth will lead to self-
transformation through ‘listening to others.’
The Other as Mediation to Self-
Understanding
The case of Ahmadiyah is corralated 
to the frame ‘true-false’ in jugding  the 
existence and sense of the other. The mode of 
existential understanding, found in Ricoeur’s 
hermenutics, can be helpful and valuable in 
interpreting religious truth and elaborated 
to accommodate the other, put in religious 
freedom context. As previosly discussed, lack 
of acknowledgment of the other is a result of 
the fixation and monopoly of the truth. As 
exemplified in the case of Ahmadiyah, the 
discourse of religious truth can be translated 
as a failure to interpret the other as a mediation to 
achieve self-understanding. 
Here Ahmadiyah is considered as an 
obstacle to purify religious truth and self. 
It is not assumed as a mediation to enrich 
and broaden self-understanding. Because 
religious freedom constitutes sociological 
version of being-in-the-world-with-others, 
therefore it is crucial to further investigate 
the meaning and the existence of ‘the others’. 
Actually, there is one basic principle in 
Ricouer’s hermeneutics, that the others 
should be placed beyond epistemological 
true-false category. Yet, it may also become 
an authentic source to self-knowledge and 
understanding (Ricouer, 1965: 49).
Self-understanding is not direct, but 
rather mediated by the others. It should 
be noted that, the truth claim, put into the 
context of religious freedom, will encourage 
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us to learn from each other. Of course, it is 
not intended to looking for justification to 
which one is true, and which one is not. The 
main important thing is, how to experience 
together, which is aim at searching for 
‘disclosure moment’, namely to actively 
participate in finding the horizon of truth 
as well as self-understanding along with the 
others. Henceforth, a few important points 
need to be outlined to argue the importance 
of involving the other as part of interpreting 
religious truth and self-understanding, 
which simply note as ethical implication of 
being-in-the-world-with-others.
First, the other functions as mediation. 
As a mediation, the others is a ‘filter’ or 
‘ideological auto-critique’ (Suratno, 2005: 
111-116)  to any narrow self-understanding, 
and also to the meaning of religious truth 
which lies its assumption a priori to self-
transparent model. It has to be admitted that 
the existence of the other as a mediation may 
stimulate ‘confrontation.’ On the other hand, 
it will stimulate sympathetic imagination 
to the others, which surpass the desire for 
objectivity, known for its true/false approach, 
as previously discussed. This imagination, 
then, leads to the suspension of truth, which 
possibly applied to the others. Basically, 
imagination always provides surplus of 
meanings for an imagined object. Imagination 
is always free so that it may provide an empty 
space for so-called ‘generosity’ or ‘abundance 
of heart’ which in turn enables the truth of 
others to grow its seed (Ricoeur,  1965: 161). 
Second, the others functions as a 
suspension  not as an obstacle neither threat 
to self-understanding (Ricoeur,  1965: 49). 
As a suspension, the others define truth 
as unceasingly dialectic process, because 
its role as interlocutor involves criticizing, 
questioning, and destabilizing the established 
perception of truth. And, more importantly, 
it gives opportunities to evaluate the self and 
to explore richer and wider authenticity and 
self-understanding. The fruitful insight that 
comes from the other further unfolds another 
fact of the truth per se, which becomes a 
basic characteristic of an inexhaustible and 
possible truth. Briefly, it is ‘through the other’ 
that is more effective to open up possibilities 
to those kind of truth.
Third, the others function as an act of 
recognition. Recognition reflects rejection 
to any irreducibility of identity while 
acknowledge the others as a demand to inter-
subjective relationship. As hermeneutical 
discourse, this recognition becomes a common 
principle in inter-subjective relations, which 
means placing the others in the main position 
and further acts as interlocutor. The act of 
recognition, in turn, leads to the recognition 
toward the primacy of communication in order 
to obtain inter-subjective definition of truth 
(Ricoeur, 1965: 51). 
Simply note that, communication is the 
structure of true knowledge. The structure 
of communication tends to eliminate clear 
and distinct self-knowledge, self-immediacy 
of knowledge, which concerns more with 
context, event, and discourse that generates 
the truth rather than the ‘formation’ of truth 
itself. Thus, those three assumptions work 
simultaneously to place the other within the 
matrix of humanity. 
CONCLUSION
Precisely, truth is more than just 
epistemological matter; but rather imagined 
as an openness of our being to question 
others and the possible. Lack of existential 
ontology in assessing the truth, which may be 
used to interpret religious truth- considered 
as a license to judge and even to eliminate 
another truth. Oppose to this idea, Ricouer’s 
hermeneutics opens up an alternate point 
which enables us to transgress true-false 
category and keep us away from falling 
into monopoly of the truth by emphasizing 
more on interpretation of truth as a ceaseless 
process through which we all strive for the 
demand of being is being for others. In addition, 
truth is a matter of questioning, suspending 
judgments, and constituting a ‘process of 
becoming’ rather than obtaining a final or 
objective truth. And finally, truth is about to 
recognize the others as basis for richer and 
wider self-understanding.
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